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In his brilliant account of the role of Puritanism in the colonization of the Americas, Jorge Cañizares-
Esguerra skilfully discerns the confluence of territorial and spiritual conquest.2 Puritan Conquistadors 
offers a breath-taking portrait of how religious impulses and the colonizing drive reinforce each 
other, shaping local, national, and transnational cultural zones. The question of difference, for 
Cañizares-Esguerra, involves the making of a cultural or racial Other as religiously-produced alterity, 
to be apprehended, managed, or eliminated within a determinate theological setting pitying the 
saved and the damned, the true adherents of the Redeemer against Satan’s steadfast disciples. On 
Cañizares-Esguerra’s vivid reading of colonial history it becomes apparent that it is religion that 
ultimately gives meaning to the fabrication of difference and differentiation in the colonial project. 
“The conquest of souls”, as Gruzinski also records in the context of sixteenth-century colonial 
Mexico, “was accompanied by a conquest of bodies designed to subject family, marriage, and 
intimate practices to the universal norms of the Church”.3 Religion and conquest were not only 
aligned in unholy harmony, but also unthinkable as separate domains requiring different logics. 
Similarly, as Winant emphatically puts it: “Yes, the Crusades and the Inquisition and the 
Mediterranean slave trade were important rehearsals for modern systems of racial differentiation”.4 
With deep historical roots shaping the union of religion and colonial subjugation, “‘between the 
seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries intellectuals confronted race primarily as a theological 
problem”.5  
 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Ritu Vij and two anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments on the first iteration of 
this article. All errors are strictly mine. I also wish to acknowledge my deep gratitude to the Editors of 
Millennium (Ilaria Carrozza, Ida Danewid, and Evelyn Pauls) for their sustained support. 
  
2 Jorge Cañizares-Esquerra, Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006). For an earlier formulation on the nexus between spiritual and worldly conquest, see 
Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, translated by Richard Howard (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).  
 
3 Serge Gruzinski, The Mestizo Mind: The Intellectual Dynamics of Colonization and Globalization, translated by 
Deke Dusinberre (New York and London, 2002), p. 57. Gruzinski’s exploration of the instability of cultural 
encounters is a remarkable intellectual achievement. His juxtaposition of contemporary cinema with colonial 
Mexican art is remarkable. For a more recent study of the relationship between religion and race in the 
articulation of difference across the 17th century and early 18th century puritan communities, see Heather 
Miyano Kopelson, Faithful Bodies: Performing Religion and Race in the Puritan Atlantic (New York: New York 
University Press, 2014).  
4 Howard Winant, ‘Race and Race Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), p. 172; pp.169-185.  
 
5 Colin Kidd, The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600-2000 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 25. Kidd relies on the pervasive presence of race in the allegorical 
imagery of the scripture in his analysis. However, with the advent of Enlightenment rationality, religion and 
science forged an alliance in making intelligible “the troubling intellectual consequences which flowed from 
the discovery of the New World” (p. 61). The crucial effect of this alliance was the consolidation of the notion 
of difference marked by a superior Aryan race over “inferior” native races. 
Also germane to the discussion is Craig R. Prentiss, ed. Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity: An 
Introduction (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003). 
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This article takes Puritan Conquistadors as a point of departure to question recent critiques of 
Eurocentrism in International Relations (IR) for silencing religion in favour of either culture or race.6 
Religion is not entirely absent as a marker of Eurocentric differentiation of the Other in these 
critiques, but these speak primarily to the pre-Enlightenment colonial context. The relative silence 
on religion in extant critiques quite ironically draws from an apparent Eurocentric spatio-temporal 
horizon embedded in Enlightenment thinking. A crucial element of that horizon is a tacit acceptance 
of secularity as the ontological condition of differentiation, reflected in wholescale 
acknowledgement of the ascendancy of Scientific Racism and the displacement of religiosity. 
However, the presumption of secularity is equally questionable, disguising more than revealing the 
continued presence of religion—a point addressed in the next section. 
 
Painted in broad strokes, this article seeks to provoke debate over the possibility of a more durable 
relation between religion and race7 than is usually acknowledged in critiques of Eurocentrism in IR. 
This strategy obviously carries the risk of collapsing various shades of critiques of Eurocentrism. 
However, that risk is mitigated by the intuition that most critiques of Eurocentrism in IR share an 
imagined secular limit, thwarting sustained investigation of the nexus between religion and race.8 
Religiously-coded racialization rarely engages the post-Enlightenment context. Rather, Scientific 
Racism commonly is assigned a privileged role.9 The relation between religion and race is 
sequestered in the pre-Enlightenment past. With the arrival of the Enlightenment, Reason and 
Science are principally thought to provision criteria for classification and difference. 
 
The present provocation to place extant critiques of Eurocentrism under scrutiny is designed to 
unsettle their normalization and uncritical embrace by the reigning orthodoxy, mostly as a safe 
supplement to mainstream IR. With renewed interest in the racialized character of IR theory, 10 
                                                          
6 “The relationship between the conquest of souls, conquest of bodies, and colonization of land”, as one 
reviewer correctly notes, “exceeds IR debates”. This important point is a key element in the discussion that 
follows regarding how this relationship has been interrogated, but especially silenced, in extant critiques of 
Eurocentrism in IR.  
 
7 According to Goldschmidt: “The concept of race, in nearly all its forms, were inseparably tied to the religious 
identities and differences that had structured European society for centuries. The boundaries of Christendom 
shaped the boundaries of Whiteness, and longstanding perceptions of heathenism shaped emerging 
perceptions of racial difference. See “Introduction” in Henry Goldschmidt and Elizabeth McAlister, eds. Race, 
Nation, and Religion in the Americas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 12-13. 
8 There are notable exceptions that either acknowledge religious or racial markers as subsequent discussion 
shows. However, it is the confluence of religion and race that typically escapes critiques of Eurocentrism. 
 
9 John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Relations Theory, 1760-
2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
 
10 Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations. The 
United States in the World Series (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). Also see Sankaran Krishna, “Race, 
Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 26, No. 4 
(Oct-Dec. 2001), pp. 401-424 for a forceful critique of IR theory over the silencing of race. For an excellent 
collection of essays on race and racism in IR, see Alexander Anievas, Nivi Machanda, and Robbie Shilliam, eds. 
Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line (London: Routledge, 2014). An 
earlier important statement, see R.J. Vincent, “Race in International Relations”, International Affairs, Vol. 58, 




especially on the heels of sustained postcolonial/Decolonial critique in the social sciences,11 the 
image of an amnesiac state of affairs concerning race may not be as pertinent today. However, the 
tendency to fold the specific character of racial or religious differentiation under a largely benign 
category of ‘Eurocentrism’ dilutes its effectivity. Disputations over broad or narrow understandings 
of Eurocentrism potentially distract analysis of the political effects of racialized imaginings and 
practice. In turn, these understandings themselves rest on a Eurocentric idea of modernity. 
Alternatively, a planetary conception of modernity would release a wider field of inquiry into the 
role of religion in human differentiation.12 IR is several steps apart from acquiring a planetary 
awareness, notwithstanding Western imaginings of Cosmopolitanism, which essentially depend on 
cultural hierarchies.  
 
To anticipate, meditations on Eurocentrism archetypally advance a linear narrative without 
adequately acknowledging the pivotal role religion continues to play in classification. Rather, 
modern hierarchies on a global scale display undeniable entanglements religion enjoys with race. 
These entanglements, both historical and contemporary, are not too opaque to avert notice. The 
securitization of religious others; the demonization of immigrants from particular religious zones; 
the rise of populist nationalism principally directed at specific religious minorities; the assumed 
social disturbance arising from the presence of religiously-coded markers of appearance (headscarf 
or veil); or the alleged offence produced by aesthetic deviance (visible, for example, in the Swiss 
minaret controversy), clearly illustrate the difficulty of separating religious and racial markers of 
alterity. These entanglements are generally disguised in narratives of the civilizing process, which is 
ultimately a secularized version of Christian ascendancy and its global effects. On the historical 
ledger, an incessantly evolving relation between religion and race shapes spatio-temporal horizons, 
cognitive and geographical maps, as well as it conditions the substance of cultural encounters. The 
restricted cultural (Western) frames within IR largely succumb to disciplinary orthodoxies, failing to 
either account for the making of a differentiated world or its logic of differentiation. 
 
The ensuing discussion is divided into three sections. Taking Puritan Conquistadors as a premise, the 
first section provides a brief engagement with the question of the centrality of religion to race. 
Section Two presents a summary of silences embedded in critiques of Eurocentrism in IR.  The final 
section of the article identifies two parallel tracks in IR, both presumably critical, but avoiding a 
dialogical encounter with each other: Postcolonial/Decolonial thought and Postsecular thinking. If 
postcolonial/Decolonial thought is silent over the role of religion in consolidating racial hierarchies, 
postsecular thinking, in turn, elects to marginalize race. Needless to say the discussion in this section 




Before returning to Cañizares-Esguerra’s narrative, it is useful to separate two broad streams in 
which discussions of ‘religion’ has generally flown: essentialist and anti-essentialist. However, there 
are also several points of merger and contact, which obviates any self-contained register of meaning. 
In the first instance, according to Clifford Geertz religion is: “(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
                                                          
11 Gurminder K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Also see Robbie Shilliam, The Black Pacific: Anticolonial Struggles and Oceanic 
Connections (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).  
12 A planetary conception is reflected notably in the work of Enrique Dussel, especially The Invention of the 




factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”.13 On the other side, there is 
Talal Asad’s anti-essentialist view which rejects any ‘transhistorical’ definition of religion. As Asad 
stresses: “there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not because its constituent elements and 
relationships are historically specific, but that definition is itself the historical product of discursive 
processes”.14 Asad sees religion in its entirety as a Christian conception linked to the relationship 
between political power and the Christian Church.15 Throughout this article, Asad’s intuition is 
respected and a more dynamic conception of religion is entertained.16 Specifically, the term ’religion’ 
is initially restricted to the Christian Faith in discussions of the connection with colonial modernity, 
but leaving open the option of understanding the relation between religion and race conceived 
within alternative cosmological worlds.17 Cañizares-Esguerra offers a superb illustration of 
competing cosmological imaginings, but mainly focuses on the Puritan religious frame and its 
restrictive cognitive field. The orientation towards ‘indiscriminate inclusion’18 follows, underscoring a 
failure of (Hegelian) recognition in the colonial context. 
 
Puritan discourses, Cañizares-Esguerra insists, present colonization as exorcism, preceding the 
orchestrated stage of spiritual gardening. Hence, the liberation of the native from the Devil would 
pave the way towards Salvation. Colonization is designed to repel Satan before the actual task of 
approaching Heaven can be consummated; the battle between Good and Evil lies at the root of the 
colonizing process and its elaborate rationalizations. In a secular world conditioned by 
Enlightenment fundamentalism, this characterization would appear anachronistic. For the actual 
makers of the colonial universe, however, any alternative mapping of the encounter with native 
Otherness would be unrecognizable.19 God’s word and work assume a unity that assigns sanctity to 
                                                          
13 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London: 
Fontana Press, 1993), p. 90; 87-125. 
 
14 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reason of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 29. 
 
15 This view is also shared by several other scholars in Timothy Fitzgerald, ed. Religion and the Secular: 
Historical and Colonial Formations (London: Equinox Publishing, 2007). 
16 However, it is crucial also to recognize the cultural specificity of meanings assigned to religion by its non-
Christian interlocutors. For an early anti-essentialist account of religion, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The 
Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Macmillan Press, 1962). For a wide-ranging critique of the “invention” 
of the idea of “world religions”, see Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
Smith offers a highly useful synoptic view of the various uses of the term and its cognate meanings. See 
Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious” in Mark C. Taylor (ed.) Critical Terms for Religious Studies. 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 269-284. “In standard academic literature”, Khan 
notes, “the standard features of “world religions” tend to emphasize (1) proselytizing missions, (2) 
homogenization into a unified system, (3) beliefs not tied to locale, but shared by unrelated groups, (4) wide 
global dispersal, (5) prophetic, as opposed, (6) orthodoxy (sole, absolute truths). See Aisha Khan, “Isms and 
Schisms: Interpreting Religion in the Americas”, (Review), Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 76, NO. 4 (2003), pp. 
766-767; pp. 761-774. 
17 The rationale for the initial choice is to set parameters to this investigation, one that principally focuses on 
critiques of Eurocentrism in IR. The option of working with a more expansive notion of religion is also 
recognized. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the implications of an expanded 
notion of religion.  




human deeds. Both the scope and intensity of colonization become intelligible once that unity is 
grasped. Neither the idea of progress nor outright cultural disdain for the colonized matches the 
force religion supplies with its easy demarcation of the existential struggle for ultimate sovereignty 
over this world and the world beyond. Defining the struggle over souls and land is a question of 
God’s sovereignty, invested in missionaries and conquistadors in equal measure. There is no 
separation between material and spirit rationalizations, since what unites the colonial project is 
providential sanction.20 The native’s soul and skin are inseparable needing erasure or Salvation.21 It is 
the native’s religious otherness manifested in colour that repels the invader; the native readily fits 
the ‘savage slot’ supplied by scripture.22 Yet, the division between the races, as Bastide notes, has 
deeper roots:  
[But] the greatest Christian two-part division is that of white and black. White is used to 
express the pure, while black expresses the diabolical. The conflict between Christ and 
Satan, the spiritual and the carnal, good and evil came finally to be expressed by the conflict 
between white and black, which synthesizes all the others. Even the blind, who know only 
night, think of a swarm of angels or of devils in association with white and black—for 
example, “a black soul,” “the blackness of an action,” “a dark deed,” “the innocent 
whiteness of the lily,” “the candor of a child,” “to bleach someone of a crime.” These are not 
merely adjectives and nouns. Whiteness brings to mind the light, ascension into the bright 
                                                          
19 In an iconoclastic analysis of the “encounter with the religious Other” in the study of religion, Cabezón 
identifies three stages. In Stage I (“They are not like us”) what is “most striking to Europeans is the sheer 
difference of the religious Other” as reflected “in the use of the nomenclature like “savagery,” “barbarism,” 
“sorcery,” “idolatry” and “heathenism” as appellations of the religious Other”. In Stage II (“They are like us, but 
we are rational”) “the term “religion” becomes universal”. However, “the West (and Christianity) are 
distinguished from others “in terms of rationality and systematicity” which is lacking in others. Finally, in Stage 
III (“They are like us, but….”) “Like religion, rationality eventually comes to be seen as ubiquitous”. The debate 
shifts to “whether other cultures possess something called “philosophy” or not”. José Ignacio Cabezón, “The 
Discipline and Its Other: The Dialectic of Alterity in the Study of Religion”, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, Vol. 74, No. 1, On the Future of the Study of Religion in the Academy (March 2006): 23-24; 21-38. 
 
20 Las Casas’s defence of ‘Indians’ against the conquistadors relies on this sanction. As O’Gorman notes: “Las 
Casas’ fundamental premise is the providential concept of history: God is the efficient and mediate cause, 
whereas man is the immediate and instrumental cause. Thus the discovery of America appears as the 
fulfilment of a divine plan which was carried out by a man chosen for the purpose”. See Edmundo O’Gorman, 
The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 19. For Las Casas see Bartolomé de Las Casas, [1552] A Short 
Account of the Destruction of the Indies, edited and translated by Nick Griffin with an introduction by Anthony 
Pagden (London: Penguin Books, 1992). Insufficiently acknowledged in affirmative interpretations of Las Casas, 
especially in IR, is his calamitous role in another sense. “By replacing their traditional belief system with the 
alien system of the occupying forces”, Castro notes, Las Casas “contributed to the destruction of the world as 
they knew it, instead of the creation of a better world, as many claim he did”. Daniel Castro, Another Face of 
Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 179.  
 
21 According to Osborn: “Every race has a different kind of soul - by soul is meant the spiritual, intellectual and 
moral reaction to environment and to daily experience - and the soul of the race is reflected in the soul of the 
individual that belongs to it. The racial soul is the product of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years of 
past experience and reaction - it is the essence or distillation of the spiritual and moral life of the race”. H.F. 
Osborn, Man rises to Parnasus: Critical Epochs in the Prehistory of Man (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1917), p. 186. 
 
22 As Voeglin proposes: “It is not the function of an idea [race for Voeglin; religion in our case] to describe 
social reality, but to assist in its constitution”. Eric Voeglin, ‘The Growth of the Race Idea’, The Review of 
Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1940), p. 284; 283-317. 
6 
 
realm, the immaculateness of virgin snow, the white dove of the Holy Spirit, and the 
transparency of limpid air; blackness suggest the infernal streams of the bowels of the earth, 
the pit of hell, the devil’s color.23  
Bastide’s analysis is noteworthy to warrant amplification. Not only does religion provide 
rationalization for slavery, in its name black skin is perceived as “a punishment from God”. In this 
context, the Biblical story of Cain (responsible for the murder of his own brother) is clearly used, as 
was the curse inflicted upon Ham, Noah’s son, charged with finding his father, Noah, in a drunken 
state.”24 Bastide connects religious symbolism to colour in general, especially its deployment in 
medieval works of art. For instance, an association is drawn between the colour yellow and its 
signification with treason. This association worked its way into Western perceptions of Asians: “The 
color yellow, or at least a dull shade of yellow, has come to signify treason. When Westerners think 
of Asiatics, they unconsciously transpose this significance to them, converting them into a trait of 
ethnic psychology.”25 Bastide records “the progressive Aryanization of Christ in strict accordance 
with the logic of color symbolism”.26 This is a crucial element in the consolidation of the idea of a 
natural affinity between Christianity and Whiteness.27 The colour symbolism is a pivotal aspect of 
religious aesthetics:28 
The entire history of Western painting bears witness to the deliberate whitening or 
bleaching effort that changed Christ from a Semite to an Aryan person. The dark hair that 
Christ was thought to have had came [sic] to be rendered as very light-colored, and his dark 
black eyes as blue. It was necessary that this man, the incarnation of God, be as far removed 
as possible from everything that could suggest darkness or blackness, even indirectly. His 
hair and his beard were given the color of sunshine, the brightness of the light above, while 
his eyes retained the color of the sky from which he descended and to which he returned.29 
                                                          
23 Roger Bastide, ‘Color, Racism, and Christianity’, Daedalus, Vol. 96, No. 2, Color and Race (1967), pp. 314-315; 
312-327. 
 




26 Ibid. p. 315. 
 
27 See Daniel Lee, “A Great Racial Commission: Religion and the Construction of White America” in 
Goldschmidt and McAlister, eds. Race, Nation, and Religion in the Americas, op. cit. For an illuminating set of 
readings on whiteness in a more contemporary context, see George Yancy, ed., What White Looks Like: 
African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question (New York and London: Routledge, 2004). Marilyn 
Lake and Henry Reynolds offer an excellent analysis of the global politics of whiteness in Drawing the Global 
Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
28 On a provocative exploration of race and aesthetics, see Simon Gikandi, “Race and the Idea of the 
Aesthetic”, Michigan Quarterly Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Spring 2001): 318-350. 
 
29 Bastide, op. cit. 315. Literary theorist Loomba offers a useful commentary on medieval texts. According to 
Loomba (2009): “Medieval texts often feature the conversion and consequent whitening of such folks: thus, 
upon conversion, black Moors fantastically become white, and unbelievers find their deformed offspring 
transformed, as in the thirteenth-century Cursor Mundi or the early-fourteenth-century The King of Tars and 
the Soudan of Damas. While such transformations can be legitimately interpreted as a sign of a somewhat 
fluid notion of identity, at another level they can also be seen to tighten the association of particular skin color 
and bodily attributes with particular faiths or moral qualities, which is a central feature of racial ideologies. The 
equation between a particular kind of body and a particular kind of religious belief is underlined when a black 
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In both Protestant and Catholic interpretations of Faith, Bastide contends, there is a broadly shared 
view of the “association of the color black with the devil and sin”. Puritanism both deepens and 
strengthens “the roots of symbolic association by arousing the idea that the contagiousness of color 
was associated with contagiousness of sin”. However, there is divergence between the two over the 
question of Salvation: “But the Protestant, feeling sure that his soul would go straight to hell, placed 
the bulwark of Puritanism between himself and the temptation of the woman with color-tinted 
skin”.30 The extended history of racism cannot be fully apprehended without acknowledging the 
nexus between the religiously-tainted idea of impurity and discrimination.”31 
 
Sin and sexuality are also inextricably linked on the cognitive register. Their nexus, however, 
provokes deeper questions concerning the difficulty of separating notions of purity from those of 
contagion. Despite the apparent disavowal of sexuality, its presence saturates religiosity.32 These 
questions shepherd inquiry into broader issues of the status of the “the body” in religion (notably in 
Christianity). Christian theology, for instance, takes the “body” as an essential site to advance the 
doctrine of Incarnation and an elaborate system of ideas built around it. Caroline Walker Bynum’s 
important intervention offers a powerful alternative to received notions of the primacy of the soul 
that has structured Western conceptions of individuality. As Bynum posits: 
 
The idea of person, bequeathed by the Middle Ages to the modern world was not a concept 
of soul escaping body or soul using body; it was a concept of self in which physicality was 
integrally bound to sensation, emotion, reasoning, identity—and therefore finally to 
whatever one means by salvation….Person was not person without body, and body was 
carrier….of what we today call individuality.33  
 
Perhaps, it is the association of the body with (religious) personhood that gives the notion of 
contagion which Bastide invokes, a durable quality in exclusionary practices which pervade 
                                                          
Muslim is depicted as being transformed into a white Christian. Indeed, it is often through such 
transformations that medieval texts imply that black and white cannot easily mingle”. Ania Loomba, “Race and 
the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, New Literary History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer 2009), p. 504; pp. 501-
522. 
30 Ibid. p. 319. 
 
31 Also see Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1966). 
 
32 For example, Maerten van Heemskerck’s mystical paintings, Man of Sorrows’ (1520-1530), according to one 
reviewer, are illustrative of how purity is ‘something more practice-oriented and entangled what that which it 
disavows’. Christianity, ‘even in its most racialized form is never fully immunitary. It involves an exposure to 
the other, which, at its most violent becomes exterminatory’. Similarly, Achille Mbembe’s provocative 
reinterpretation of the carnal aspects within religiosity disrupt easy affinities between purity and conversion. 
See Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 212-234. 
As Mbembe notes: “Even asceticism, an exercise supposed to allow desire to be mastered, and the flesh and 
its concupiscence mortified, does not escape the carnal”, p. 234, fn. 7. These examples can be read against the 
backdrop of Ashis Nandy’s classic formulation of the colonial encounter in The Intimate Enemy: Loss and 
Recovery of Self under Colonialism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,. 1983). Nandy’ refusal to countenance 
unidirectional accounts of the colonial impact remains iconoclastic.   
33 Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 11. 
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contemporary politics.34 “When fear was not sufficient, barricades of an institutional nature were 
established”.35 A curious part of Bastide’s analysis is its contemporary relevance, albeit in different 
‘secular’ vernaculars of enunciation, but not entirely devoid of strong religious sentiment, imagery, 
and political intent. However, there are no simple pathways connecting notions of contagion to 
outright exclusion. The ambivalence within liberal contexts between claims of hospitality and the 
potential hazards of inviting radical alterity, for instance, complicates the storyline.   
 
To return to the implications of Puritan Conquistadors, progress and other Enlightenment prejudices 
come much later once the spiritual ground has been cleared.36 The shift from Deity to the human 
travels numerous tortuous pathways before the ascendancy of the Earth over Heaven can be 
realized. At best, the emergence and assumed triumph of humanity over the Divine remains a partial 
and incomplete narrative, frequently disavowed in the face of the return of binaries of the Good and 
Evil, reappearing in the sanitized language of civilization and its barbarous others. The conflict 
between cultural and racial others over territory, presumed pasts or expected futures, can now 
assume a secular form, stripped of metaphysical essences. Yet, the world of immanence remains 
ensnared in the unfinished affairs of transcendence. God and Satan refuse to be evacuated from a 
domain humans regard strictly as their own. In actuality, humans confirm their inability to be 
sovereign without divine (or satanic) aid and abetment.37  
 
Cañizares-Esguerra offers a stark corrective to extant methodological squabbles in IR; the staged 
battles between Realist theoretical convictions of durable human insecurities and Constructivist 
stories of interpretative reality; or scuffles over the primacy of ontology over epistemology or the 
other way around. More basic questions return that involve the fragile character of secular 
modernity, the continued relevance of binaries established in/by religion, but especially the 
                                                          
34 According to Winant: “World history has, arguably, been racialized at least since the rise of the modern 
world system; racial hierarchy remains global even in the postcolonial present; and popular concepts of race, 
however variegated, remain in general everyday use almost everywhere”, Winant, “Race and Race Theory”, 
op. cit. p. 170. 
35 Bastide, op. cit. p. 319. 
 
36 According to Buell, “Modern understandings of race as inherent and immutable have been used especially to 
differentiate Christians from Jews, and ethnicity still serves as the common shorthand for scholars to denote 
distinctions between these two categories. But this is not how early Christian texts use race. Instead, many 
early Christian texts depict Christians as members of a race and people, like Jews, so that “race” does not mark 
the dividing line between Jews and Christians”. Denise Kimber Buell, “Rethinking the Relevance of Race for 
Early Christian Self-Definition”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2001), p. 450; 449-476. 
 
37 To be certain, race thinking has never remained static. The point that is being stressed here is the continued 
entanglement between religion and race. According to Banton, for instance: “In the first half of the nineteenth 
century the framework within which scholars contemplated the interrelations of peoples was drawn from the 
Old Testament. The dominant view was that all peoples descended from Adam and Eve. The word "race" was 
used in what now seems a loose fashion to identify many different categories of humans. That some peoples 
were less advanced technologically than others was seen as the will of God, the consequence of environment, 
or the outcome of differences in their moral life/culture, as we would now say. As the study of man's physical 
nature advanced, all this changed. The conviction grew that mankind had consisted originally of a limited 
number of independently created races of varying capacity and with distinctive abilities. Some mixing had 
occurred, but it still made sense to see each man or woman as the representative of a particular race”.  
Michael Banton, “1960: A Turning Point in the Study of Race Relations”, Daedalus, Vol. 103, No. 2 (1974), p. 32; 
31-44. On Hannaford’s interpretation, racial thinking is unthinkable without conflation of the biological with 
the social. Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996).  
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imbrication of difference with a religiously-authorized Otherness. The universe of modernity is 
enchanted after all, not with secular deities but with the real and spectral presence of religion. 
Reading critiques of Western IR through the prism of Puritan Conquistadors radically shifts the 
question of the substance of IR away from the obsessive hold of Hobbesian sovereignty or the 
imagined liberal intimations of cosmopolitanism back to the durable imaginaries of religion that are 
either consistently occluded in the established canon, or approached merely with feeble intent in 
critiques of Eurocentrism. The absence of religion in these critiques, as noted, serves as the core 
theme of this essay: the surprising omission or relative neglect of the salience of religion in the 
production of racial Otherness, not only in colonial space-time, but as a durable aspect of 
racialization in postcolonial contexts. Despite exhortations by notable scholars for discarding the 
language of race38, neither its cognitive grip nor practice in its shadow has departed from the social 
and cultural fields. Calls for ‘post-racial’ awareness closely trail the expectations of liberalism that 
seem increasingly frail with the barricades, not open doors, defining the zeitgeist of our times.  
The efficacy of religion for racial differentiation may not be apparent to IR, especially in a ‘secular 
age’39, but renewed emphasis on the convergence between religion and race can reveal a picture of 
determinate entanglements, inversions, mutual reinforcements, and authorizations. From the 
perspective of the colonized or postcolonial subjects, however, the so-called ‘secular age’ is always 
already the age of religious conversions and racial differentiation.40  
 
The refurbished language of civilizational binaries, moral panic linked to the ‘swarm’ of unwelcome 
migrants41, or the normalization of revulsion towards particular religious communities in the 
contemporary political context of resurgent provincialism, pose striking challenges to the claims of 
liberalism, notions of hospitality, and cosmopolitan imaginings.42 The merger of religion and race 
recognized primarily as a feature of colonial modernity appears to return with intensity in a world 
presumably more connected and better aware of diversity. The long history of anti-Semitism 
stresses the conjoining of race and religion,43 but also the difficulty of separating the two. 
                                                          
38 Paul Gilroy, Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line (Harvard, MA: Belknap Press, 
2000). A key irritation for Gilroy is the salience of biopolitics in race-talk and the equation of an individual’s 
identity solely on his or her body. For a forceful critique of Gilroy, see Simon Gikandi, “Race and 
Cosmopolitanism”, American Literary History, Vol. 14, No. 3, An “ALH” Forum: “Race and Antebellum 
Literature” (Autumn 2002): 593-615. Gilroy’s thinking appears to have evolved from his earlier important 
statement in The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1993). 
39 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). A key point missed by 
many commentators of Taylor’s magisterial account is his insistence on seeing secularization as a process 
radically transforming theology, but invoking a ‘theological’ riposte. 
40 This point is effectively conveyed by one of the reviewers. 
 
41Note David Cameron’s remarks to ITV, “PM blames Calais crisis on 'swarm' of migrants”, 
http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-07-30/pm-a-swarm-of-migrants-want-to-come-to-britain/ 
Accessed on 17 January 2016. 
 
42“Contrary to the assertions of many analysts of new racisms”, Loomba notes, “it is not the case that religion 
is a preracial form of difference or the “latest” form of racism or the form of difference confined to the global 
South; rather religion has been crucial to the development of modern forms of racism all across the globe, and 
in ways that we need to engage today”. Loomba, “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, p. 508. 
43 See Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler, Eds. The Origins of Racism in the West 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Edward H. Flannery, The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty-Three 
Centuries of Anti-Semitism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965); Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, 
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Islamophobia offers a contemporary example.44 Admittedly, the religiously-imbued racial gaze does 
not simply go in one direction; it invariably produces its antithesis, perhaps not as ‘refined’ or as 
subtle on the ‘civilizational’ ladder of its hegemonic counterpart. Hence, the buttressing of 
subalternity even in the discursive realm of racialization: the racialized Other lacking the capacity to 
properly racialize.   
 
The confluence of territorial and spiritual conquest also brings into focus how religious practice in its 
diverse expressions mediates, makes, and unmakes multiple worlds that escape the strictures of a 
Christian framework, but also conditions the colonizing impulse. Imbricated in the entanglements of 
religion and race are myriad forms of Christianity that draw inspiration from it, but also 
fundamentally deviate from the established script. 45 An inclusive account of the heterodox character 
of entanglements would, therefore, encompass both the encounter narratives, but also the creative 
use and disavowal of Christianity in the colonial context. An exaggerated focus on Eurocentrism fails 
to illuminate the mobilizing role of religion in varied spatial and temporal terrains. A powerful 
example of transmutation can be found in Brazilian philosopher-anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro’s account of the Christian encounter with the Tupi-speaking people in Sixteenth Century 
Brazil. Conversion and reversion of Christianity was read as evidence of the native’s inconstancy.46 
                                                          
Christian Beliefs and Antisemitism (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to 
Discrimination: Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980); Léon Poliakov, 
The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe, translated by E. Howard (New York: Basic 
Books, 1971); and Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Antisemitism (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1966). As Allport also notes: “Most persecutions and inquisitions of the past, especially the vicious and 
shameful, have occurred within religious contexts”.  Gordon W. Allport, “The Religious Context of Prejudice”, 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1966), p. 447; 447-457. A key theme in Carter’s 
brilliant account is the inversion of the European encounter with colonial others: what invokes the European-
Christian racial imagination is the figure of the “Jew” which then paves the way for apprehending colonial 
others. Kant’s principal contribution is to confer race with a “transcendental essence” with far-reaching effects 
on the Western imagination. Also, Carter restores the salience of internal otherness in Europe and 
Christianity’s persistent attempts to extricate itself from its Jewish origins. See J. Cameron Carter, Race: A 
Theological Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Another key contribution to the discussion is 
Carter’s demonstration of the determinate role of theology in the construction of the human as a racial entity. 
For a different reading of the genealogy of racism, see the important contribution by Arendt.  See Hannah 
Arendt, ‘Race-Thinking before Racism’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1944), pp. 36-73. An engaging 
reassessment of Arendt is offered in Kathryn T. Gines, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2014). Also see Vincent W. Lloyd, ed., Race and Political Theology (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012). For an elective affinity between Protestant Theology and Nazism, see Alan 
Davies, “Racism and German Protestant Theology: A Prelude to the Holocaust”, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol, 450, Reflections on the Holocaust: Historical, Philosophical and 
Educational Dimensions (July 1980): 20-34. 
44 On Islamophobia, see Ayhan Kaya, “On Islamophobia”. In Jocelyne Cesari, Ed. The Oxford Handbook of 
European Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, 
Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); and Mohamed Nimer, 
Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism: Causes and Remedies (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 2007).  
45 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this important insight. The remaining part of this section relies 
heavily on this reviewer’s comments.  
 
46 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, The Inconstancy of the Indian Soul: The Encounter of Catholics and Cannibals in 
16th Century Brazil, trans. Gregory Duff Morton (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2011). “Among the pagans of 
the Old World”, de Castro writes, “the missionary knew what resistances would have to be overcome: idols 
and priests, liturgies and theologies—religions worthy of the name, although rarely as exclusivist as the 
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Religion conditions race and the colonial project; but it is also conditioned by colonial exigency. No 
fixity can be attributed to the relationship between the conquest of souls and the conquest of bodies 
or land. An instance of fluidity can be found in Conroy-Krutz’s superb account of missionaries in their 
encounter with the natives. Unable to reconcile the Christian belief in a universal human community 
with the dictates of racial supremacy, missionaries created a “hierarchy of heathenism” to make 
sense of a varied cultural world.47  Similarly, the dynamic nature of the colonial encounter48 in Africa 
become apparent where, as Mudimbe notes, “representations of religious systems bind, fuse or 
oppose each other in synthetic discourses which, at a different level, might transmute into 




What does the so-called return of religion in IR portend for race? A favourite staple of extant 
thinking about religion in IR is the notion of its “return from exile”.50 This idea is questionable. The 
‘return’ narrative misguides understanding of the religiously textured character of IR. It unwittingly 
embraces the secularization thesis in its alleged desire for repudiating that thesis. As several key 
early 20th century political thinkers show, what appears as ‘secular’ is neither self-subsistent nor 
outside the religious.51 The ‘secular’ in one instance can be read as an extension of the ‘religious’. 
Alternatively, the ‘secular’ can be seen as a repressed version of the religious. Religion scarcely 
relinquishes its presence from the political field; it only assumes secularized forms of instantiation. 
Hence, it materializes on new registers of sovereignty, modern subjectivity, and political community. 
First, within modern international space, markers of difference take on the appearance of ‘imagined 
                                                          
missionary’s Christianity. In Brazil, on the other hand, the word of God was eagerly welcomed with one ear and 
negligently ignored with the other. Here, the enemy was not a different dogma, but an indifference to dogma, 
a refusal to choose. Inconstancy, disinterest, forgetfulness” (p. 4). For de Castro, “The inconstancy of the 
savage soul, in its moment of openness, is the expression of a mode of being where exchange rather than 
identity is the fundamental value to be sustained” (pp. 30-31). 
 
47 Emily Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 48. In a more contemporary setting, Robbie Shilliam’s vivid exposition 
of ‘deep relations’ informed by alternative religious cosmologies in the Black Pacific also undermines IR’s 
secular or Christian self-understandings. Neither the language of secularity nor the Christian (largely 
Protestant) vernacular provide direct access to worlds that repudiate Cartesian divisions. See Shilliam, Black 
Pacific, op. cit.  
48 The dynamic nature of the colonial encounter is best analyzed in Ashis Nandy’s classic formulation in The 
Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,. 1983). 
Nandy’ refusal to countenance unidirectional accounts of the colonial impact remains iconoclastic.   
49 V.Y. Mudimbe, Tales of Faith: Religion as Political Performance in central Africa (London & Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1997), p. ix. 
50 Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
 
51 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George Schwab. 
Foreword by Tracy B. Strong, Chicago: University of Chicago, [1922]; 2005; Walter Benjamin, The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: New Left Books, 1977); and Karl Löwith, Meaning in 
History (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1949). For a competing view celebrating 
modernity’s self-subsistent character, see Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1983.  
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communities’52 of nation and nationalism; religion must compete with the imaginary identities 
bequeathed by nationalism. Secondly, modern subjects are political, not cultural or religious, 
constructs. Religious subjectivity cannot exist outside of the political. Hence, even with the rising 
tide of religious symbolism, there is a downgrading of alternative (religious) sources of the Self. 
Finally, the horizon of transcendence increasingly shows signs of entrapment within the spatio-
temporal universe of immanence. God cannot be approached outside of politics, the State, and that 
realm of authorization the State produces. The secularized materialization of religion merely 
disguises religion’s clandestine, and increasingly not-so-clandestine, presence in social and political 
spheres.   
 
Extant critique of Eurocentrism in IR, which progressively gains centre-stage as a part of normal 
science remarkably shows only marginal curiosity in religion as a crucial element in consolidating 
racial and cultural otherness. In the shadow of postcolonial/Decolonial thought, this neglect seems 
anomalous. Upon closer inspection, however, the silences become explicable. In part, religion is 
often collapsed under the capacious label of ‘culture’. The axiomatic Self/Other encounter between 
the colonizer and the colonized passes as a meeting of cultures, a hermeneutic exercise in mutual 
self-discovery. Indeed, if religion marks the initial point of contact, it quickly fades into insignificance 
once colonization has been consummated. Encounters between the conquistadors and the 
indigenous inhabitants in the Americas, for instance, present themselves as unequal cultural 
exchanges, not as clashes between two religious cosmologies committed to rival understandings of 
Divine Sovereignty.53 In other ‘critical’ accounts in IR, though, the incommensurable cosmological 
field is acknowledged, but it is swiftly displaced by question of Lockean notions of property, both 
‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ biological theories of race, or the nature/culture divide separating the 
colonizer’s Cartesian cognitive universe from the assumed permeability of nature and culture in the 
native’s planetary imaginings.  
 
Alternatively, if particular versions of the equation of Christianity and Whiteness are entertained, 
not merely as a feature of colonization, but as a more durable, if implicit, element in the constitution 
of racial hierarchization, analyses of contemporary worlds becomes thinkable. As noted, the recent 
upsurge in racialized markings of political discourse, the rise in perceived danger from particular 
religious others, and growing unease with the presence of religious alterity—in dress, soundscape, 
or architecture—mixes religious and racial anxieties. The language of (Western) civilization congeals 
the two sets of overlapping fears to generate ever more inhospitable ‘national’ spaces. Neither 
religion nor race can autonomously explain the current state of xenophobia permeating the political 
landscape. 
 
The re-emergence of the language and politics of hate against the memory of twentieth-century 
horrors also seems incredulous in globalizing times. However, if the deeper well-springs of 
differentiation are recognized, the possibility of historical inversions can be appreciated. Similarly, 
reductionist accounts of race theorists that rely principally on the ‘colour line’ can be discounted in 
favour of explanations that permit the idea of convergences. In the present instance, a focus on the 
                                                          
52 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd Rev. 
Edition (New York: Verso, 1991). 
 
53 Few scholars are attentive to this point. Two exceptions are noticeable: Naeem Inayatullah and David L. 
Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference (New York and London: Routledge, 2004 
especially chapter 2, “Intimate Indians”, pp. 47-91; and Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, 
and Africans (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Also see Siba Grovogui, “Come to 
Africa: A Hermeneutics of Race in International Theory,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 26, No. 4 
(Oct-Dec. 2001), pp. 425-448. 
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confluence of religion and race can offer more determinate analyses of the pervasive appeal of both 
the language and politics of hate. A key element of convergence is the mythic character of political 
communities and its others.54 Religion resonates with the deeper structure of myth-making and its 
circulation over time.55 These processes inevitably involve sublation (aufheben). On this view, the 
dance between religion and race produces potent political effects.  
 
To contextualize, a key implication of the arrival and consolidation of Enlightenment rationalism is 
the disentanglement of religion from racialization, which is essentially premised on theological 
grounds. Hence, the triumph of Reason is meant to liberate thought from the shackles of race 
thinking and racism drawn from religious edicts or their interpretation. As promised in the sanctified 
narrative of the Enlightenment, in time the expected detachment of race from religion would 
unavoidably happen. However, the secularization thesis rests on the contradictory notion of 
religion’s decline without abandoning fundamental religious understandings of ethics, morality, 
notions of right and wrong. Enlightenment preserves these basic ideas in the name of Reason.  
 
Postcolonial/Decolonial thought has consistently shown that the hegemonic story does not turn out 
the way it is predestined, nor is it as idyllic as recounted by true devotees of the Enlightenment, both 
in the wider scholarly community, or its affiliates within (Western) IR. Not only does religion 
demonstrate resilience, the Enlightenment successfully funnelled race to newer depths. Race and 
race thinking morphs into science, buttressed by the idea of history, the newly assigned place of the 
European Man in history, the march of progress—from nature to consciousness or the Providential 
journey from Africa to Europe, and eventually the mission civilisatrice. The Enlightenment elevates 
race to becoming the essential marker of difference, truncating humanity on scientific lines. In the 
name of humanism, humanity is riven apart. Race disqualifies much of humanity, sending it to the 
lowlands of barbarism, savagery, or nature. Without consciousness or conscience, whole continents 
would now recede into historical oblivion. Yet, as a limit-figure of modern Europe,56 these ‘areas of 
darkness’ are also necessary for crystallizing ‘the West’. Differentiation displaces difference, setting 
up rigid hierarchies now confirmed by the sleight of fictitious ethnographic evidence, climatic and 
biological conjectures, or in refined philosophical mappings premised on the idea of history and the 
unstoppable voyage of consciousness to self-consciousness. ‘Paradoxical as may seem’, Frederickson 
notes, ‘the rejection of hierarchy as the governing principle of social and political organization, and 
its replacement by the aspiration for equality in this secularist world as well as in the eyes of God, 
had to occur before racism could come to full flower’.57 
                                                          
54Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, trans. William 
Sayers (London: John Hopkins University Press, 2003. 
55 The relation between myth and religion needs to be perceived in dynamic terms to avoid an essentialist 
reading. Both myth and religion are continuously reinterpreted. However, the parameters of reinterpretation 
are not entirely fluid; they need to confirm to recognizable rules in each cultural environment. See Peter 
Heehs, “Myth, History, and Theory”, History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1994): 1-19. For a classic 
statement on myth, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980. Reprint of 1978 University of Toronto Press edition. 
  
56 Patricia Purtschert, ‘On the Limit of Spirit: Hegel’s Racism Revisited’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 36, 
No. 9 (2010): 1039-1051. 
 
57 George Frederickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 47. For a 
comprehensive account of the historical trajectory of race, see Hannaford, Race, op. cit. The nexus between 
theology and race is superbly analyzed in Carter, Race, op. cit.  Also see David Goldberg, ed. Anatomy of 




The retelling of the Enlightenment story continues to suffuse dominant versions of Western IR, 
displaying few signs of temperance. Assuming new forms, the Albatross easily passes from one 
discursive realm to the other: from mission civilisatrice to development, from natural hierarchy to 
civilizational particularism. The overt language of race may no longer circulate as freely in public or 
scholarly discourse, but the force of race thinking perseveres. In its generic simplicity, race thinking 
insistently highlights cultural deficiency as the master explanation of failed states, poverty and 
destitution, and political volatility in large swathes of the non-Western world. Implicitly, cultural 
deficiency in the non-West endorses European (now Western) exceptionalism and its cultural 
correlates. As Dubois stresses, there was ‘a complex and contradictory tangle of Enlightenment 
intellectual currents that both celebrated universality of the human race and put forth hierarchical 
and differentialist theories about different groups that are often of startling arrogance and racism’.58 
With Enlightenment, as Buell notes, an inversion seems to have transpired in the relation between 
religion and race: 
 
Modern notions of race as they emerged in Romanticism defined race as natural, heritable, 
and immutable; by the late nineteenth century, this organic understanding of race had been 
produced as objective, authoritative knowledge by the newly dominant disciplinary practices 
of the biological sciences. As the academic discipline of the comparative and historical study 
of religion emerged in the late nineteenth century, these understandings of race were used 
to define and classify religions, especially to mark the dividing line between “particular” and 
“universal” religions.59 
 
In place of “the Christian/not-Christian differentiation”, Buell notes, “alternative articulations of 
difference (especially biologically-based explanations)” emerged. Their principal purpose was “to 
justify slavery and the displacement of native peoples but also to restrict immigration”. A view 
shared by many other scholars of the downgrading of religiously-based racism, Buell sees the 
adoption of “scientific racism” by the end of the nineteenth century “as the dominant theoretical 
model of imagining human differences as natural and immutable”.60  
                                                          
As a contested concept, ‘race’ is inseparable from the cognitive spaces produced in time. Ashcroft, Griffiths & 
Tiffin offer a very useful characterization of the term: “‘Race’ is a term for the classification of human beings 
into physically, biologically and genetically distinct groups. The notion of race assumes, firstly, that humanity is 
divided into unchanging natural types, recognizable by physical features that are transmitted ‘through the 
blood’ and permit distinctions to be made between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ races. Furthermore, the term implies 
that the mental and moral behaviour of human beings, as well as individual personality, ideas and capacities, 
can be related to racial origin, and that knowledge of that origin provides a satisfactory account of the 
behaviour”. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002[1998]), p. 198. Also see Cedric Dover, ‘Race: The Uses of the Word’, Man 95 
(April 1951). For an analysis of race in contemporary politics, see Mike Cole, Racism: A Critical Analysis 
(London: Pluto Press, 2015). David N. Livingstone effectively tackles the question of racial classifications in 
“Cultural Politics and the Racial Cartographies of Human Origins”, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 204-221.   
58 Laurent Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic”, 
Social History, 31, 1 (2006), p. 1; pp. 1-14. 
 
59 Denise Kimber Buell, “Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition”, op.cit. pp. 451.  




Hence, the relation between religion and race is not unidirectional;61 inversions are possible with 
race conditioning religious differentiation. Hegemonic accounts of the Enlightenment affirm the 
secularization of consciousness in linear terms. Once released from spiritual bondage, the narrative 
proposes, humanity requires new standards of classification, differentiation, and measurement.62 
Religion no longer supplies the rationale of separation; reason and its spatio-temporal framing do. 
The divide between Light and Darkness drawn in scripture and religious practice metamorphoses 
into Civilization and Barbarism, between those with history and self-consciousness and those 
without either history or consciousness. Enlightenment’s totem-pole requires no religious 
inscriptions. Yet, it is the Enlightenment that consolidates both the idea of race and rationalizes its 
uses in the service of differentiation and empire.63 The hegemonic account is resolute on an 
irreversible break between religious and secular worlds. This story is consecrated in the Westphalian 
myth with an endless supply of buyers in the Western IR community. Even those who serve as the 
vanguard of critique against IR’s multi-faceted Eurocentrism find few traces of religion in the 
fabrication of race. The critique of Westphalia or scientific racism escapes the crucial, ‘foundational’ 






                                                          
61 According to Long: “While the reformist structure of the Enlightenment had mounted a polemic against the 
divisive meaning of religion in Western culture and set forth alternate meanings for the understanding of the 
human, the same ideological structures through various intellectual strategies paved the ground for historical 
and evolutionary thinking, racial theories, and forms of color symbolism that made the economic and military 
conquest of various cultures and peoples justifiable and defensible”. Charles H. Long [1986], Significations: 
Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1995), p. 4. A major 
point in this outstanding book is not only the indivisibility of religion and race, but its presence in thinking 
itself.  
62 As Augstein notes: “Nineteenth-century racial theory combines several elements: the first is the notion that 
mankind is divisible into a certain number of ‘races’ whose characteristics are fixed and defy modifying 
influences of external circumstances. Secondly, it contains the idea that the intellectual and moral capacities 
may be unevenly spread within the various human races. Thirdly, it advocates the notion that mental 
endowments are bound up with certain physiognomical specificities which, being defined as racial 
characteristics, are considered to reveal the inward nature of the individual or the population in question.” 
H.F. Augstein, ed., Race: The Origins of an Idea, 1760-1850 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. ix-x.  
63 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed. Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers 1997). According to Eze, “[T]he Enlightenment’s declaration of itself as “the Age of Reason” was 
predicated precisely upon the assumption that reason could historically only come to maturity in modern 
Europe, while the inhabitants of areas outside Europe, who were considered to be of non-European racial and 
cultural origins, were consistently described and theorized as rationally inferior and savage”, (p. 4). Also see 
Robert Bernasconi, ‘Who invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of 
Race’, in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), Race (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 11-36; and Susan-Buck-Mors, Hegel, Haiti 
and Universal History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009). Buck-Morss’s monograph is an 
expanded version of the argument spelled out in her path-breaking article, “Hegel and Haiti”, Critical Inquiry, 
Vol. 26, No. 4 (Summer 2000): 821-865. 
64 Hobson’s far-reaching critique of Eurocentrism is silent on religion. A similar problem informs Vitalis’s 
important account. See John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, op. cit.  Vitalis, White 






Whilst the amnesia Krishna notes65 may not be as acute today with the rediscovery of race in Critical 
International Relations (IR), the new awareness still remains marginal to the discipline.66 Similarly, 
greater appreciation of the pervasiveness of religion in international life has dramatically changed 
the contours of engagement. To contextualize, until quite recently, IR theory has long harboured the 
conviction that with the Protestant compromise, religion would eventually abandon the (public) 
social, political, and cultural terrains and inhabit principally the private realm. Once enshrined solely 
within the European archive, the modularity of this compromise ensured global diffusion of its 
universal appeal. Those less enchanted with the Westphalian universal merely sanctioned the 
persistence of pre-modern pathology: material and cultural stagnation, bigotry and intolerance, and 
political immaturity.  
 
The stubbornness of religion, it’s assumed resurfacing from deathly slumber, or worldwide 
resurgence, however, has largely exposed the fragile claims of the Enlightenment, but especially 
European particularism, including its limited appeal even within the European cultural sphere. 
Religion’s alleged resurrection in the political sphere has reopened the perceptual field to re-
examination of IR’s Enlightenment inheritance. Yet, the confluence of religion and race in the 
postsecular setting still remains either poorly recognized or not adequately catechised in received 
accounts.  
 
Critical IR has produced a sizeable archive of postcolonial/Decolonial thought, one that highlights 
Eurocentric impulses in theory and method. Critiques of Eurocentrism in Western IR continue to 
supply new pathways to probe the foundational myths of the discipline as a vital part of critical 
awareness. Recent work has also helped produce alternative historical trajectories suppressed in 
received accounts. On a separate footing, there is a growing repudiation of secularist Western 
framings of identity and politics. The apparent puzzle is the emergence of two parallel tracks that 
rarely show any signs of either merger or dialogue.  
 
                                                          
65 Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations”, op. cit.  
66 Meditations of race are not a late arrival to theorizing in IR. In fact, they lie at its philosophical core. For a 
ground-breaking statement by one of Europe’s greatest philosophers, see Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from 
a Pragmatic Point of View [1798], translated by Victor Lyle Dowdell (Southern Illinois University Press, 1996). 
For a sustained analysis of Kant’s association with European racism, see Bernasconi, ‘Who invented the 
Concept of Race?” op. cit. Mark Larrimore, ‘Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the “Races”’, in Catherine 
Wilson ed.), Civilization and Oppression (Calgary University Press, 1999), pp. 99-125.This is how Kant 
characterizes natives Americans in Toward Perpetual Peace, the sacred text for modern cosmopolitans: “That 
their temperament has not become entirely adequate to any climate can also be inferred from the fact that it 
is hard to find any other reason why this race, which is too weak for hard labour and too indifferent for 
industrious work, and which is incapable of any culture even though there are enough examples and 
encouragement in the vicinity [namely, the example set by the European colonial settlers], stands far below 
even the Negro, who occupies the lowest of all other levels which we have mentioned as racial differences” 8: 
176. For a provocative reading of the location of the “negro” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, see Ronald 
Judy, “Kant and the Negro”, Surfaces, Vol. 1, No. 8. http://philosophy.eserver.org/judy-kant.pdf Accessed on 
14 January 2017. 
 
A more sympathetic reading of Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers can be found in Sankar Muthu, 
Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton University Press, 2003). For Kant’s evolving thoughts on race, see 




The first track, drawn from postcolonial/Decolonial thought, attempts to expose the Eurocentric 
character of the discipline. Critical interrogation provides an impressive inventory of silences and 
exclusions concerning either race or culture, or both, that underwrites disciplinary IR. Succumbing to 
poststructuralism or resisting its seductive appeal, postcolonial/Decolonial thought has produced 
sharp analyses of the complicity of knowledge and empire.67 The problem of difference in these 
accounts lies at the core of dismantling self-serving (and largely self-referential) theorizations of the 
international.68 The principal finding in postcolonial/Decolonial readings is the tenuous nature of 
theorization of difference. Failing to recognize coloniality or differentiation, hegemonic accounts 
merely recycle the ‘colonizer’s model of the world’;69 it presents modernity as European 
exceptionalism, divorced from world history and Europe’s colonial adventure.  
 
A key problem with virtually all extant variants of critique of Eurocentrism in IR, however, is that 
they typically conflate culture and race.70 In general, culture and race tend to be used 
interchangeably, discounting not only analytical difference, but more significantly, their divergent, 
albeit overlapping, genealogies. The problem of conflation between culture and race is compounded 
by the silencing of religious difference, but also apathy towards the imbrication of religion in the 
constitution of (cultural or racial) difference. In sum, critics of disciplinary IR have largely unnoticed 
the interconnection between religion and race.71 In general, postcolonial critics see this 
interconnection principally as a feature of the pre-history of modernity. Enlightenment thinking 
discovers new philosophical principles, not religion, to rationalize Europe’s marginalization and 
dehumanization of difference. Paradoxically, critique of Enlightenment racism unsuspectingly 
embraces the underlying secularization narrative of modernity. On this view, religion seems to lose 
its grip in servicing exclusions with the advent of modernity. The possibility of inversion, as 
previously mentioned, is not entertained.  
 
On an alternative reading, repudiation of the secularization thesis has already placed into doubt the 
assumed marginalization of religion under conditions of modernity in its early or late instantiations. 
In the contemporary national and international settings, particularly, the not-so-subtle racialization 
of religion is inseparable from religiously-coded differentiation most pervasive in the language of 
(Western) civilization. The latent secularity in postcolonial/Decolonial thought is intelligible on its 
contradictory relation to humanism.72 On the one hand, humanism (and the commitment to 
                                                          
67 The work of Edward Said remains central on this nexus. See especially, Orientalism (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978); and Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage Books, 1994). 
 
68 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, op. cit.  
 
69 J.M. Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New York 
and London: The Guilford Press, 1993).  
 
70 This echoes Loomba’s caution: “Religious difference is understood to be rooted in culture, affiliated to 
discourses of faith and belief rather than those of the body, and therefore, at least theoretically, less rigid. But 
the history of racial formations testifies not to neat separation between these categories but to their deep 
interconnection; without such interconnection we cannot understand the very development of what is now 
referred to as “scientific” racism”. See, Loomba, “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, op. cit. 
p.503.  
 
71 As mentioned Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference; and Grovogui, 
“Come to Africa”, op.cit. are important exceptions. 
 
72 Anidjar defends Said’s secular criticism “as a critique of Christianity, secularized or not”. See Gil Anidjar, 
“Secularism”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33 (2006), p. 62; pp. 52-77. 
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universal equality) provides the justification for critique. It is the denial of co-evalness across races 
and cultures that diminishes humanity. Yet, on the other hand, “thicker” forms of identity often 
ensconced in (imagined or symbolic) religious identities are occluded in the humanist frame. 
Humanism renders all transcendental claims subordinate to the regime of immanence.73 Hence, the 
secular/religious divide reinforces differentiation. This is the unintended consequence of humanist 
belief. Convinced of its superior ethical horizon, humanism ends up accentuating division within 
humanity between those with Reason and others embracing Faith. 74 
 
The second track, postsecular thinking, has a more recent timeline. Drawing mainly from philosophy, 
the ‘postsecular turn’ captures various strands of thought.75 Different variants of postsecular 
thinking serve as ciphers of a new variant of counter-Enlightenment, albeit, cognizant of wider 
cultural worlds outside Europe or the West. In part, postsecular thinking is a response to the 
apparently unexpected global reappearance of religion in the public sphere. Recognizing a secular 
bias in political thought, the language of the postsecular appeals to the need for re-problematizing 
religion.76 At a more basic level, however, postsecular thinking is a continuation of early twentieth-
                                                          
73 The sources of humanism run deep, especially the theological notion of monogenesis, an idea that can also 
be interpreted effectively to condone conversion. As Loomba notes: “It is often suggested that it was the 
medieval and early modern belief in monogenesis—the notion that all human beings were, in the words of St. 
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human groups as distinct species (504). Augustine writes: “If they be definable to be reasonable creatures and 
mortal, they must be acknowledged to be Adam’s issue.” St. Augustine, Of the Citie of God, trans. John Healey 
(London: George Eld, 1610), “Race and the Possibilities of Comparative Critique”, op. cit., pp. 580-582. 
 
74 Desecularizing postcolonial/Decolonial thought, therefore, becomes undeniably a crucial step towards 
epistemic decolonization. 
 
75 Notable contributions on postsecular theorization will unavoidably include: Talal Asad, Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University Press, 2003); Alain Badiou, St. Paul: The 
Foundations of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); John Caputo, On 
Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2001); Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan (eds), Political 
Theologies in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Jacques Derrida, Acts of 
Religion, ed. and Introduction by Gil Anidjar (New York and London: Routledge, 2002); Jürgen Habermas, 
Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); 
and Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, op. cit.  For a post-modern reading of religion with a revived commitment to 
the idea of justice. See John D. Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, After the Death of God edited by Jeffrey W. 
Robbins (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Dalferth offers a contrarian view which sees postsecular 
societies as neither religious nor secular. See Ingolf U. Dalferth, “Post-Secular Society: Christianity and the 
Dialectics of the Secular”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 78, No. 2 (June 2010): 317-345. In 
religious studies, however, recent thinking has challenged the basic foundations of investigating religion. For a 
forceful voice, see Mark C. Taylor (ed.) Critical Terms for Religious Studies. (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). For a sceptical view on the postsecular turn, see Jen Köhrsen, “How Religious is the 
Public Sphere? A Critical Stance on the Debate about Public Religion and Post-Secularity”, Acta Sociologica, 
Vol. 55, NO. 3 (September 2012): 273-288. 
 
76 The literature on the so-called “return” of religion in IR is vast and growing. For some important 
contributions see John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owen, eds.,The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and 
International Politics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, 
Bringing Religion into International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Petito and Hatzopoulos, 
eds., Religion in International Relations, op. cit.; Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the 
Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2005). For an anticipation of this trend, see Peter L. Berger, Ed. The Desecularization of the 
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century debates over the character of modernity. A key element in those debates revolves around 
the ‘secularized’, not secular, character of political modernity. The presence of religion, on one side, 
is demonstrable in conceptions of sovereignty and authority or in notions of human rights, morality, 
and justifications for war. On the other side, political modernity represents a basic rupture from 
religion, attached to the flowering of Reason, not Faith. The postsecular turn, however, concerns not 
only the continued presence of religion, but its mutation, reflected in newer notions of the Self and 
society.77 On a postsecular reading, religion merely becomes another mode of being within a largely 
secular(ized) world. 
 
In the sphere of IR theory, postsecular thinking stresses IR’s failure to acknowledge its religious 
origins or to adequately recognize religious phenomena without relying on the binary ‘religious-
secular’ logic drawn from secularization theorists. Above all, postsecular theorizations turn the gaze 
towards the difficulty, if not impossibility, of purging religion from the social and political worlds. A 
key implication of recognizing religion as a durable feature of these worlds is an openness towards 
religious alterity. Tacitly rejecting the equation of modernity and secularism, recognition of religious 
difference afforded by postsecular sensitivity can expand the hermeneutic register without 
advancing cultural hierarchies. Yet, postsecular thinking has been largely trapped within (Western) 
cultural fetters, unable to acknowledge difference on its own terms.78 Furthermore, postsecular 
silence over the question of race impedes its appeal. 
 
The two tracks identified above seem to demonstrate remarkable indifference towards each other. 
Hence, critiques of Eurocentrism rarely admit the presence of a robust postsecular world or its 
theorization. Similarly, postsecular warriors walk away from critics of Eurocentrism in IR with serene 
disregard. The postsecular turn’s obsessive regard for the religious is matched equally by its 
unawareness of questions of race or racialization. Acknowledgement of religious others or respect 
for persistent forms of religiosity within Europe appear to serve for them as an adequate surrogate 
for race. Unacknowledged in these (postsecular) formulations is the paternalistic gaze that 
inescapably informs theoretical encounters with difference. The relative simplicity with which the 
question of race is subsumed under the capacious category of the religious only confirms the 




The persistence of durable forms of racial differentiation is a continuous reminder of colour-
blindness in IR.79 Recent critiques of Eurocentrism in IR increasingly recognize not only the 
differentiated nature of the international, but of theory’s inability to escape its cultural 
constrictions.80 These constrictions are deeply embedded in ontological, epistemological, and 
                                                          
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999) and José Casanova, Public 
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methodological assumptions of all versions of IR theory.81 As noted, awareness of Eurocentrism in IR 
increasingly serves as an acceptable supplement to received Orthodoxy without threatening the 
latter’s grip on theoretical practice. The normalization of critique is largely an inescapable feature of 
its self-referentiality and separation from politics.  
 
In turn, critiques of the “secularization thesis” reflected both in the so-called “return” of religion and 
the postsecular turn have exposed the provincial character of IR theory. The persistent and pervasive 
existence of religious sensibilities within and across ‘national’ boundaries also exposes ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological assumptions of dominant versions of IR theory. These 
assumptions are usually read, either as the manifestation of the secular character of IR theory, or 
contrariwise as confirmation of an indelible imprint of the Protestant compromise (enshrined in the 
Westphalian myth in IR).   
 
International practice, though, increasingly manifests the confluence of religion and race and the 
difficulty of separating the two in explaining processes of differentiation and exclusion. Without 
adequate recognition of religion in critiques of Eurocentrism and sufficient appreciation of race in 
postsecular theorization, the two frames of capture are likely to remain apart. In the first instance, 
critiques of Eurocentrism in IR cannot pretend to fully disown Enlightenment’s spatio-temporal 
horizon whilst wedded to its secular commitments. In the second instance, postsecular thinking risks 
reproducing its own version of Eurocentrism without recognizing race as a crucial marker of 
differentiation, not reducible to religious difference. A dialogical encounter and convergence 
between the two registers of critique can provide new openings for understanding.    
 
 
                                                          
81 Hobson, The European Conception of World Politics, op. cit. 
